Abele DP - Plan
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Breuss zum
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Pissarides
(Persistenzmechanismen) wiederholen und zusammenfassen |
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Pissarides:
Martin’s Notizen ansehen |
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Artikel aus
Finazwesen wiederholen und zusammenfassen: Windisch, Abele, Obermann, Breuss
und Schäffer |
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Gibbons
(Spieltheorie) und Romer (Shapiro Stiglitz) wiederholen und zusammenfassen |
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Meine Notizen
durchlesen |
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Einführung in
die VWL – Abele wiederholen und zusammenfassen |
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Varian
wiederholen und zusammenfassen |
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Dennis Snower
(Unemployment Policies) wiederholen und zusammenfassen |
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Arbeitsmarktparadoxon |
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Coe & Snower (Complementarities) |
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Neue Notizen
ansehen |
Pissarides: Loss of skill during unemployment & persistence of shocks
When unemployed workers loose some of their
skills, the effects of an employment shock can persist because of a "thin
market externality". Market becomes thin because job seekers as a whole
have less human capital.
Example: Negative
shock – less people hired – loss of skill – shock is over – even more
unemployed than in the previous equilibrium since market remains thin and
people have less human capital
Model: 2
overlapping generations of workers of size L. (1=short-term unemployed) Young
workers and old previously employed produce 2 units of output each,
(2=long-term u.) previously unemployed 2y, (3) unemployed zero output. Each
worker stays only 2 periods, both types same wages
level of employment: Xt = 2Lqt
probability that job meets a short-term unemployed: (1+qt-1)/2
..etc.& 1376, also equation for the supply of jobs Jt
shows positive correlation betw/ # of jobs and y
Notes for Cobb-Douglas: a =
Sucheffektivitaet der Firmen gegenueber der Sucheffektivitaet der Arbeiter,
wenn a < ½ dann konkave
Funktion, sonst konvexe mit 3 Gleichgewichten

Duration
dependence and persistence: worker’s
input into matching measured in "efficiency units of search" so that
a worker who supplies c efficiency units of search receives a job offer w/
probability p = cq, therefore to maximize the profit each short-term unemployed
tries to maximize cq*1-c2/2, see & 1382
Falling search
intensities – cobweb cycle: adverse shock
à low employment à more long term
unemployed, and lower effective supply of labor à job
searchers increase intensity of search à higher
employment
Gibbons – game theory
These models allow economists to study the
implications of rationality, self-interest and equilibrium.
two-player, simultaneous-move games, w/ no
"private" information
Iterated elimination of iterated strategies -